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Abstract
With the Central and East European countries increasingly included into the international division of  labour
in the European Economic space, we are prompted to  ask  whether  this  integration  operates  on  a  level
playing field with respect to competition policy. In fact, a  comparison  between  the  more  advanced  West
European countries and countries in Central and East Europe reveals that effectiveness of  implementation
of competition law and policy and intensity of competition are lower in the East and in particular also  in  the
new EU member countries of Central East Europe, where the institutional framework of the West had been
largely adopted for some time now. The EU recently decided  to  reform  competition  policy  by  delegating
some of its powers to national competition agencies. Notably, this coincided with the accession of the most
advanced countries in Central East Europe to the EU.  We  discuss  whether  this  reform  is  likely  to  spur
competition or whether it may turn out to  be  rather  ill-designed  given  the  particularities  in  post-socialist
economies.
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1         Introduction
In the early years of systemic transformation in Central East  Europe  (CEE),  the  introduction  of
competition laws was  mainly  governed  by  the  goal  of  promoting  contestable  markets  within
domestic economies through regulatory tools such as bankruptcy, company law and  competition
law. In the course of negotiations of accession to the EU, the most advanced transition  countries
were  required  to  align  their  legislation  with  that  of  the  EU  which  included  prominently  the
implementation of competition policy-relevant chapters of  the  acquis  communautaire  (see  e.g.
Hölscher/Stephan, 2004). With the (near-)complete transposition of the acquis communautaire  in
the new EU member states, it is now time to take stock of the achievements  of  EU  enlargement
with regards to ‘fair play’, i.e. whether there is a level playing field  for  competition  in  factor  and
good markets  between  East  and  West.[4]  Nearly  all  countries  in  the  East  have  enacted  a
competition law and have installed some form or other of a competition agency during  the  1990,
but it remains an unresolved issue as to whether this  may  have  resulted  in  having  a  common
competition law on the books (de jure) without  much  actual  enforcement  and  hence  effect  on
markets (de facto). The wider issue relates to the degree  of  subsidiarity  applied  to  competition
law taking for example the United States system as an alternative approach
            Research on this  issue  is  scarce  (possibly  due  to  its  political  sensitivity)  and  mainly
revolves around a control of these countries’ harmonisation obligations vis-à-vis the EU.  What  is
particularly  needed  is  research  on  the  issue   of   enforcement,   i.e.   the   actual   impact   on
“productivity, intensity of competition, behaviour of private undertakings,  enterprise  mobility  and
creation of a competition culture” (Cseres, 2006). This  papers  aims  to  help  to  fill  this  gap  by
assessing the scope of competition law in these countries, developments in  the  effectiveness  of
its enforcement and the resulting intensity of competition, and this with a particular  focus  on  the
latest reforms of EU competition policy. In an  earlier  study,  we  found  that  enormous  progress
with  the  introduction  and  maintenance  of  the  new  competitive  order  in  the  then  accession
countries was made, but also that quite a variety of national differences prevailed until  late  2003
(Hölscher/Stephan 2004). The issue  of  fair  play  between  East  and  West  has  gained  further
importance in Europe lately. This is mainly due to intensifying trade between  East  and  West  as
well as the inclusion of CEE countries into the enlarged European  division  of  labour  in  general
and the extension of the European  common  market  to  the  new  EU  members  in  the  East  in
particular. In this respect, the  countries  in  the  East  have  become  important  if  not  the  prime
targets for foreign direct investment and outsourcing by European firms,  which  is  feared  to  put
employment within Western Europe at stake. As a result, Western governments  are  increasingly
concerned with fair play and a level playing field  between  East  and  West.  Moreover,  the  new
member states are now included into the EU structural funding schemes  which  are  designed  to
assist the weaker of member states to catch up in terms of competitiveness vis-à-vis  their  richer
competitors. The use of resources grated by the latter is tied to rigid rules not  least  with  respect
to competition policy and the donor countries of course have to be reassured that their  resources
will not give rise to undue competitive advantages in the countries at the receiving end.
            The paper reviews the most important conceptual EU policy issues related to competition,
such as the role of anti trust regulations and law enforcement, with particular emphasis placed on
the situation and regional particularities of the new EU member  states  in  Central  East  Europe.
This is the focus of the first  chapter.  Here,  we  critically  review  the  modernization  package  of
European competition policy that coincided the Eastern enlargement of the EU and  consider  the
adequacy of the new EU legal and policy framework for the new  EU  member  states.  Then,  the
paper turns to an  empirical  representation  of  the  scope  of  competition  law,  effectiveness  of
competition law and  policy  enforcement,  as  well  as  intensity  of  competition  in  Central  East
Europe and the new EU member states  in  particular.  Their  competition-profiles  are  measured
with qualitative as well as quantitative methods. The analysis  operates  on  two  levels,  a  macro
view  and  an  institutional  perspective  by  comparing   case   numbers   and   by   focussing   on
particularly important cases in the most recent past. These  levels  are  seen  as  complementary,
each level individually contributing to forming a picture of  competition  policy  in  CEE  sufficiently
wide in terms of comprehensiveness and deep in terms of  preciseness.   This  analysis  supports
our main finding: that we are a long way from a level playing field between East and West as  the
effects of the reform package remain ambiguous. There is little that the political sphere can do  to
speed up things.
2          The modern EU concept of competition policy
Traditionally, the concept for  competition  policy  in  the  EU  was  based  on  the  West  German
ordo-liberal model of anti-cartel legislation within the social market economy.  This  meant  that  a
set of prohibitions was established in order to protect competition by  preventing  anti-competitive
practices  and  the  abuse  of  market  power.  These  regulations  were  enforced  by  a  rigorous
procedure, which left the Directorate General for Competition at the EU Commission (DG  Comp)
as the ultimate politically independent decision-making institution, which  had  the  sole  power  to
e.g. grant exemptions from de jure prohibitions  where  overriding  economic  objectives  were  at
stake.[5] With these powers of jurisdiction, DG Comp could  operate  almost  independently  from
the  EU  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  governments  of  EU  member  states.   Basically   every
agreement between firms was illegal until it was explicitly approved by the Commission, either  in
that clearance was granted (because it did not violate the codified prohibitions,  Art.  81/3),  or  by
granting an explicit exemption (or also if they fall under a de-minimis rule).
            This procedure created its own bureaucracy with  administrative  overload  and  delays  in
decision making. Early proposals for reform were halted by DG  Comp’s  fear  that  any  step  into
that direction would lead to a restriction of its powers by  the  EU  member  states.  On  the  other
hand, the  growing  power  of  this  institution  became  visible  from  2001,  when  fines  imposed
exceeded with over € 1,800 million in one year[6] the sum of all fines in the entire history  of  cartel
law enforcement with the EU. The sum of fines  even  kept  growing  with  highest  sum  in  cartel
cases ever so far in 2007[7], indicating that DG Comp’s enforcement of competition policy has  in
fact been strengthened significantly. The reform of EU competition policy in 2004 did not  change
that.[8] Kallaugher/Weitbrecht (2006) assume that the 2006 record  “will  surely  be  surpassed  in
2007 where the first two hardcore cartel decisions have already resulted in a total of €1,743 million
of fines being assessed” (p. 318).
Figure 1: Fines and Decisions by DG Comp between 1995 and 2005
Source: DG Comp annual reports and internet-site.
With case numbers and total sums of fines dropping to much  lower  levels  after  their  temporary
peak in 2001, work-load of DG Comp became less  and  less  manageable  and  it  comes  as  no
surprise that DG Comp attempted to delegate some of the work to national competition  agencies
in the framework of a profound reform of EU  competition  policy  –  this  at  the  then  peak  of  its
might. In addition to this,  the  implementation  of  the  new  modern  competition  policy  package
coincided with EU Eastern Enlargement (“double whammy on enlargement day”, Riley 2005) and
the commission’s official rationale was that enlargement would create  even  further  overload  for
Brussels and that the burden should be shared between the authorities of all EU member states
            Effective since May 2004, the EU competition policy concept featured an explicit move  to
a more pro-active competition policy in general (EU 2004a) and the  delegation  of  power  to  the
competition agencies (NCA) and courts of member  states  (EU  2004c)  with  the  introduction  of
regulation 1/2003, most prominently altering the application of  Articles  81  and  82  (EU  2004b).
This replaced regulation 17/1962 and is widely seen as the biggest change in  competition  policy
over the last 40 years – sometimes even referred to as “legal and cultural revolution”  (Ehlermann
2000). The reform hence altered both the body of substantial law, guidelines for its interpretation,
and  the  institutional  division  of  labour  (or  mode  of  cooperation)  between  Brussels  and  the
member states (institutional set-up).
                        Main components of the competition policy modernization package
             •            Setting-up of the European Competition Network (ECN) consisting of 25 National
Competition Authorities (NCAs) and DG Comp at its centre
            •          Self-assessment of companies involved in cooperation (legal exemption rule 81/3)
            •          Pro-active investigations and sector inquiries
            •          “More economic approach” to competition policy
            This reform has raised a  controversial  discussion  amongst  experts  well  before  it  was
enacted, prompted by a white paper in 1999 (EU 1999): at the most general level, critics such  as
Möschel (2000), Deringer (2000), and in a later  assessment  also  Pirrung  (2004)  hold  that  the
new system may result in a loss of critical information for DG Comp.  Furthermore,  markets  may
be expected to become less transparent also to third parties like  competitors,  suppliers,  as  well
as consumers, and –what is even more– legal certainty  for  companies  planning  cooperation  is
feared  to be compromised (e.g. Bartosch 2000). On the other side, Schaub (2000), an  advocate
of the  new  reform,  stresses  that  the  reform  has  the  potential  to  better  structure  European
competition policy by strengthening consultation and cooperation between the  national  agencies
themselves and between those and DG Comp.
            One major point of reform  is  the  establishment  of  the  European  Competition  Network
(ECN), the objective of which is to reduce DG Comp’s workload. This network features a hub-and-
spoke design with the national competition authorities and national  courts  around  DG  Comp  at
the centre. The spirit of modernization emphasizes a European culture of competition and  draws
a picture of co-operation and co-ordination, where the network assists both the national agencies
and DG Comp. In that sense, the Commission “escapes” its own agency constraints by  replacing
itself by the  network  (where  it  however  still  assumes  a  leading  role).  By  establishing  close
collaboration and mutual  consultation  between  all  relevant  European  competition  institutions,
Schaub (2000) holds, the ECN could potentially strengthen information  symmetry,  coherence  of
judgements, and reduce conflicts between the institutions. This  in  turn  may  reduce  transaction
costs both in judging cases and in dealing with complaints from economic agents. Not  least,  and
in particular with respect to the new EU member states, the ECN may then  also  be  expected  to
both raise the pressure upon national institutions to converge in their  actions  and  may  increase
potentials for institutional learning. Whereas the latter effect  is  beyond  doubt,  the  exchange  of
information between agencies turned out to be a particularly sensitive problem of confidentiality.
With  DG  Comp  and  most  European  national  competition  agencies   being   politically
independent, Wilks (2005) compares the ECN with the European Central Bank’s (ECB)  board  of
governors: the 25  national  agencies  would  co-operate  with  the  pre-defined  goal  of  ensuring
competition like the ECB is targeting price stability.  Whilst  this  characterisation  does  catch  the
envisaged cooperative nature of this new institution, the analogy however  is  misleading:  for  the
ECB, a system of ‘one country – one vote’ was introduced and obviously  there  is  only  a  single
currency within the Eurozone. If the  power  over  competition  policy  is  referred  to  the  national
agencies  of  the  network,  then  the  capability  of   practical   action   may   well   be   distributed
asymmetrically. Next to DG Comp, the network will most likely be dominated  by  the  strong  and
most renowned agencies like the UK’s Office of Fair Trading, the German Bundeskartellamt,  and
maybe the French authorities. We suspect that the new EU member states  will  be  the  weakest
link in the ECN, because competition culture and institutional experience is less developed there.
“Those NCAs [National Competition Agencies] are underresourced, have limited experience  and
expertise, face large-scale cultural and industrial challenges, and are working with  inexperienced
courts who are often ‘illiterate’ in antitrust thinking”, as Wilks (2005) speculates. If this speculation
turns out to be correct – and we will analyze its credibility in the next section – the  modernization
package  is  in  fact  a  potential  threat  for  European  competition  culture  in  general   and   the
envisaged level playing field  between  East  and  West  in  particular.  In  2007,  Wilks  coins  the
characterisation of the ECN as a “uniquely independent supranational network” (p. 1) of  powerful
government agencies that form a regional equivalent of the WTO for competition. It  is,  however,
noteworthy that the ECN with its  executive  powers  to  enforce  competition  policy  clearly  goes
beyond the institutional mandate of its transatlantic  equivalent  of  the  International  Competition
Network (ICN).
In this respect  the  new  EU  competition  policy  appears  to  follow  the  example  of  US
antitrust policy. Indeed this could have been a policy alternative. In the US the  antitrust  policy  of
the federal government seized to exist since the 1970s. Since then  landmark  cases  of  antitrust
policy were initiated by another company or a  state  attorney  general’s  office.  “When  important
cases go to court,  the  federal  government  is  simply  not  there”  (Mueller  1996,  p.  428).  This
however  is  not  the  practise  in  the  EU  as  here  a  new   system   of   regulatory   co-opetition
(Esty/Geradin) between the NCA, the ECNs and the DG Comp seems to emerge.
            The second most controversial component of the reform of EU competition policy pertains
to the  legal  exemption  rule  in  cartel  law,  in  which  companies  have  to  self-assess  whether
cooperation is legal or rather forms  an  illegal  cartel.  Previously,  firms  operated  a  more  legal
certainty because they were able to receive immunity  when  being  granted  formal  approval  for
cooperation by DG Comp. The whole system is turned around in that now companies  produce  a
self-assessment and can go ahead with their plans as long as the NCAs or in fact  DG  Comp  do
not interfere. In a nutshell: whereas in the past, all was forbidden that was not  explicitly  allowed,
today, everything is allowed that is  not  explicitly  forbidden.  In  a  critical  review  of  this  reform
component, Bartosch (2000) holds that this to be installed regulation significantly increases  legal
uncertainty: in economic terms, this may have an important impact on technological development
in  general  and  the  intensity  of  innovation  in  particular,  if  one  assumes  that  at  least  some
innovations critically depend upon inter-firm co-operations: legal  uncertainty  may  prevent  some
firms  to  engage  in  such  risky  yet  welfare-enhancing  activities.  This   would   be   particularly
detrimental  with  respect  to  the  Lisbon  agenda  in  general  and  for  Central  East   Europe   in
particular, as here, dynamic economic development and technological upgrading is needed whilst
companies do not have the information, historical precedence, or experience to be able  to  judge
whether cooperation is legal or not.
            The other components of the modernization package  are  less  disputed,  as  in  general,
they  give  more  powers  to  the  national  authorities  and  national  courts,  which  now  can  act
deliberately on their own suspicions  and  their  informants  may  be  granted  immunity  (leniency
programme). Also, decisions are  now  to  be  made  under  a  more  prominent  consideration  of
economic issues such as  power  on  relevant  markets,  the  extent  and  effectiveness  of  entry-
barriers, and ‘dynamic economic efficiency’. Rather than focussing on a pure legal  application  of
market  share  thresholds,  on  exclusively   the   legal   criteria   for   an   existence   of   anti-trust
agreements, and on the sheer lawfulness of state-aid, the focus of the ‘more economic approach’
(as discussed by Schmidtchen 2005)[9] is on the economic effects of competition-related  issues.
Whilst most economists tend to approve of this, a  clear  and  generalisable  definition  of  criteria,
defining ‘dynamic efficiency’ are until now elusive and only future can tell whether this vehicle will
be abused by some NCA and whether institutional capture may become more likely.
            In regard to the overall reform  package,  Geradin/Henry  2005  report  scientists  that  are
concerned with the reform leading to ‘forum shopping’ (quoting Jenny 2000),  to  a  fragmentation
process  (quoting  Mavroidis/Neven  2000),   and   possibly   even   to   misguided   decisions   by
inexperienced authorities (quoting Riley 2003). They  themselves  are  a  bit  more  cautious  and
stress the importance of ‘structural weaknesses’,  including  inefficiencies  in  the  judicial  system
and a lack of teaching and research programmes in universities in areas relevant  to  competition
policy. They also challenge the view of the Commission that firms and their councils  in  the  East
have sufficiently good knowledge to be  able  to  perform  self-assessment  with  respect  to  legal
exemption rule (p. 26).
3          Observations
The new EU-member  countries  in  Central  East  Europe  (in  our  empirical  analysis,  we  focus
primarily on Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) have already fully  adopted  the  chapters
relevant to competition and competition policy[10] in and around 1999 to 2001: Poland  amended
its  national  competition  law  in  several  steps  since  the  late  1987  and  enacted  the  “Act  on
Competition and Consumer Protection” in 2000.[11] The  modern  Czech  Republic’s  competition
law was first drafted in 1991 and after two amendments in 1992 was harmonized  with  European
law with the “Act No. 143/2001 on the Protection of Competition” in 2001.  Hungary  also  aligned
its national competition law to suit the conditions of a market-based economic system  already  in
1990 and after four subsequent amendments  enacted  the  so  far  last  amendment  to  the  “Act
XXXVI on the Prohibition of  Unfair  Market  Practices”  to  match  the  acquis  communautaire  in
2001. All three countries have installed competition agencies as politically independent offices. In
fact, the officials in the then-transition countries appear to have fully acknowledged the necessary
contribution that  competition  makes  to  systemic  change  and  catch-up  development.  This  is
suggested by several statements made at the OECD Global Forum  on  Competition  (see  report
by  Kronthaler/Stephan/Emmert  2005).  Never-the-less,  most  accession   states   have   in   fact
negotiated  some  transitional  derogations  for   the   full   implementation   of   European   Union
Competition  Policy  (see  EU  2005  or  the  section  on  “Transitional  measures   negotiated   by
acceding countries” on euractiv.com, prepared by the French  Ministry  of  the  Interior  MINEFI  –
DREE):  most  of  those  transitional  agreements  grant  exemptions  only  until  2008  and  none
concern Arts. 81 and 82. Transitional agreements for the phasing-out of incompatible fiscal state-
aid mainly for small and medium enterprises were concluded until 2011 with Hungary, Malta, and
Poland (for more on derogations, see Cseres, 2006, p. 7 and Känkänen, 2003, p.26-28).
3.1      THE MACRO VIEW ON INTENSITY OF COMPETITION
Empirical research assessing this development of competition policy implementation in CEECs is
rare and slightly dated. In an earlier study, we found that enormous progress with the introduction
and maintenance of the new competitive order in the  then  accession  countries  was  made,  but
also that quite a variety of national differences prevailed until late 2003 (Hölscher/Stephan 2004).
The most comprehensive study by (Dutz/Vagliasindi 2000) could only  sketch  the  beginnings  of
the process and suggested that having formal implementation on the books is not  enough.  Their
assessment  leads  them  to  conclude  that  there  is  a   robust   relationship   between   efficient
competition policy (enforcement, advocacy, and institutional design) and intensity  of  competition
in  transition  economies  (see  also:  Campbell/Vagliasindi  2004).  This   will   be   updated   and
questioned by using  different  methods  below,  bearing  in  mind  that  full  compliance  with  EU
competition policy is politically not at stake until today. In  empirically  describing  and  comparing
competition policy across national jurisdictions, we are constrained by only a  very  small  number
of possible indicators. We identify a set of four country-level indicators[12]: the first is an indicator
of the scope of competition policy  (Hylton/Deng,  2006),  including  seven  sub-categories  which
makes this index very comprehensive indeed (for a  more  precise  description,  see  box  below):
extraterritoriality,  remedies,  private   enforcement,   merger   notification,   merger   assessment,
dominance, and restrictive trade practices. The second index for competition policy combines the
state of development of competition law and policy enforcement and relates this  to  the  state-of-
the-art in West Europe (EBRD), the third attempts to quantify the effectiveness of anti-trust policy
by way of interrogating individuals in business and politics (WEF), and  finally  the  forth  provides
an average of the intensity of local competition again by use of interrogation (also WEF).
            As a first overview of competition policy, the “competition policy  scope  index”  developed
by Hylton and Deng is an extensive institutional  analysis  of  102  national  competition  agencies
and their governing laws provides a rating that  is  explicitly  designed  to  be  comparable  across
countries. Table 3 lists our countries of concern in CEE  and  as  a  comparison  in  West  Europe
additionally Germany for the year of 2004, the only available  assessment  made  by  Hylton  and
Deng.
Table 1            Competition policy scope index and its sub-categories (as of 2004)
|              |Overall  |Extraterritoriality (1)                                 |
|              |index    |                                                        |
|              |(30)     |                                                        |
 | |2000 |2001 |2002 |2003 |2004 |2005 |2006 |2007 | | | | | | | | | | | | |Bulgaria |1991 |2+ |2+ |2+ |2+ |2+ |3- |3-
|3- | |Czech Republic |1991 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 | |Estonia |1993 |3- |3- |3- |3- |3- |3- |4- |4- | |Hungary |1990
|3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3+ |3+ | |Latvia |1991 |2+ |2+ |2+ |3- |3- |3- |3 |3 |  |Lithuania |1992 |3- |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3+ |3+ |
|Poland |1987 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3+ |3+ | |Romania |1996 |2+ |2+ |2+ |2+ |2+ |2+ |3- |3- | |Slovak Republic
|1994 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3 |3+ |3+ | |Slovenia |1992 |3- |3- |3- |3- |3- |3-  |3  |3  |  |Note:      *                         EBRD
Competition Policy  Indicator:  ranked  between  1  and  4+,  whereas  1  indicates  that  in  the
specific  country  exists  no  competition  legislation  and   institution;   4+   indicates   that   the
standards are equal to those  of  typical  advanced  economies.  Grey  shaded  areas  indicate
changes in the rankings over time.
Source:              IWH-database on Competition Law  Enactment  in  Developing  and  Transition  Countries;
EBRD Transition Reports 2000-2007.
Table 1 indicates  that  nearly  all  countries  in  Central  and  East  Europe  enacted  their  first  competition
legislation in the first half of the 1990s  (with  the  notable  exception  of  Romania,  which  enacted  in
1996 and joined the EU with Bulgaria in 2007).  Even though competition laws were enacted,  we
observe little progress with regard to the implementation process well until  mid-2000:  ratings  on
average correspond to the time elapsed since enactment (when accounting for apparent country-
specifics) and most ratings remain unchanged in the period assessed. It is only  in  2006  (and  in
Bulgaria  already  in  2005),  that  Central  European  transition   countries   achieved   a   marked
improvement in the effectiveness of their competition policy enforcement. Only in the case of  the
Czech Republic, no  improvements  were  recorded  and  today,  the  ranking  is  only  surpassed
downwards by Romania and Bulgaria. For  the  other  countries,  the  pressure  of  the  European
Union via its acquis communautaire and the positive effects of the ECN may have triggered these
improvements. In general, however, this suggests  that  the  implementation  process  in  a  post-
socialist economy is much more difficult to master than expected and  needs  considerably  more
time in terms of  the  learning  curve,  institution-building,  and  competition  advocacy.  Our  main
countries of concern, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, all reach levels  at  or  above  3,
however,  still  far  away  from  the  standards  and  performance  typical  of  advanced   industrial
economies.. This  supports  the  contention  that  there  is  still  no  level  playing  field  within  the
enlarged European Union between its new member states and the ‘old’ union.
                        EBRD transition indicator for competition policy
             1           no competition policy legislation
            2          competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms
            3          some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a
competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial
reduction of entry restrictions
            4                     significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to
promote a competitive environment
            4+        standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies; effective
enforcement of competition policy, unrestricted entry to most markets
            Source: EBRD 2005, p. 203.
The highest score in any of the Central and East European countries is achieved by Estonia  with
a 4-, just two marks off of the highest  possible  score  of  4+.  With  other  policy-areas  achieving
higher EBRD scores (e.g.  for  enterprise-reform,  price  liberalisation,  trade  and  forex  systems,
financial institutions, and infrastructure(, this indicates that competition policy  in  those  countries
clearly lags behind the other economic policy areas (for the  countries’  rankings  in  these  fields,
refer to EBRD, 2007).
            The EBRD-indicator unfortunately  is  only  constructed  for  Central  and  East  European
transition countries with the score of 4+ serving as a proxy rating for  the  western  EU  members.
This does however not measure the gap between the new and old EU  member  states.  A  direct
comparison with a comparator country from the group of West European economies, in our  case
Germany, is only possible by use of other indicators, constructed for the World  Economic  Forum
and published annually in the Global Competitiveness  Report:  the  first  is  the  Effectiveness  of
Antitrust or Anti-monopoly Policy indicator, and the second is the Intensity of  (local)  Competition
indicator. Both are constructed by way of interviewing experts and practitioners and  use  a  scale
between 1 and 7 with increasing effectiveness of anti-trust or anti-monopoly  policy  at  promoting
competition on the domestic market (Figure 2)[13] and with increasing  intensities  of  competition
on local markets (Figure 3).
Figure 2: Effectiveness of anti-trust policy between 1999 and 2007
Ranked between 1 and 7, whereas 1 indicates that in the specific
country effectiveness is lowest and highest with 7.
Source: World Economic Forum, various issues.
The direct comparison confirms our observation that the effectiveness of anti-trust policy is  lower
in our selection of Central East European Countries, with  levels  around  6.0  for  Germany  as  a
benchmark in the West and around 4.0 for Poland and slightly more for the Czech  Republic  and
Hungary.[14] At variance to the EBRD-indicator, the variability of the WEF rankings  over  time  is
higher which may be rooted in the differing methods of generation of the two sets of indicators. In
particular, the rankings appear to have fallen in Poland and Hungary in the  early  years  of  2000
and improving thereafter. In contrast, the ranking of  Germany  has  even  increased  in  the  mid-
2000s, further widening the gap between the East and the West. This  provides  further  evidence
that the implementation of a strong competition policy in post-socialist countries  is  a  particularly
difficult and time-consuming process that even  may  experience  steps  backward.  Possibly,  the
disciplining   effect   of   the   negotiation   process   in   the   relevant   chapters   of   the    acquis
communautaire was strongest immediately after the negotiations have come to a close  and  only
picked  up  with  the  latest  reforms   of   the   European   Competition   Policy   framework.   The
implementation of the modernisation package in 2004 appears to have had a positive  impact  on
the transition countries under observation.
             Furthermore  we  would  expect  that  this  lesser   effectiveness   of   competition   policy
enforcement may also result  consequently  in  a  lower  intensity  of  competition  on  markets  in
Central East Europe. Despite the fact that West and East form an integrated economic area  with
intense exchange both in terms of trade in goods and  services  and  in  terms  of  Foreign  Direct
Investment and Joint Ventures, a lower intensity of competition in the East may be the result of  a
lesser effectiveness of competition policy. This can  be  tested  empirically  by  use  of  the  World
Economic Forum indicator of Intensity of (local) Competition.
Figure 3: Intensity of local competition between 1999 and 2007
Ranked between 1 and 7, whereas 1 indicates that in the specific
country intensity is lowest and highest with 7. The bars for 2001
do not directly compare with other years due to a change in method.
Source: World Economic Forum, various issues.
Here,   differences   between   East   and   West   are   not   as   pronounced   as    for    anti-trust
effectiveness.[15] Still, a clear picture emerges: the intensities of  local  competition  are  lower  in
even the most  advanced  transition  economies  and  new  EU  member  states  in  Central  East
Europe.  In  2007,  they  reach  a  level  of  around  4.7  and  5.7,  whereas  our  West   European
benchmark reaches a level around 6.3. Admittedly, West European  countries  like  Greece  (4.8)
and Portugal (4.9) are closer to transition countries (later entrant Luxembourg with  a  level  of  as
low as 4.4 is hardly comparable due to its specific nature), but never-the-less, we  may  conclude
that not only competition policy is less developed  and  less  effective  in  Central  East  European
transition economies, also the intensities of competition are lower.
            In terms of the development of indicators over time[16], we again observe that  intensities
of competition tend to increase in Germany, whereas the  trend  is  more  erratic  in  Central  East
Europe which may well be a result of privatisation programmes  in  the  early  phase  and  foreign
direct investment all over the  period  observed.  Again,  we  observe  a  widening  of  the  gap  in
competitiveness between the ‘old’ member of the EU and Poland as  well  as  Hungary,  whereas
the Czech Republic appears to catch up.
             Another  and  more  refined  method  of  statistical  analysis  enquiring   the   intensity   of
competition and the effectiveness of enforcement of competition laws at the macro level would be
the distribution of firms according to their individual  markets  shares;  Herfindahl  or  Gini  indices
would then be able to highlight the extent to which the largest  firms  dominate  relevant  markets,
indicators already quite close to intensity of competition. For such  an  analysis,  however,  cross-
country comparable data is generally not available.
3.2       The Institutional view on Intensity of Competition
A FURTHER WAY OF APPROACHING the development of competition policy  and  intensity
of  competition  would  be  an  analysis  at  the  institutional  level,  i.e.  the  national   competition
agencies. Here, however, the limitations of any quantitative comparative analysis  of  competition
policy effectiveness are reached (Nicholson 2004). Prima facie  NCAs  in  the  East  are  typically
converted departments  from  former  central  planning  administrations  and  are  today  in  some
cases surprisingly well resourced in terms of the sheer  numbers  for  budgets  and  staffing  (this
pertains in particular to the Polish agency, not so much to the Hungarian).[17]  When  joining  the
Union, the Central East  European  economies  were  required  to  introduce  the  complete  legal
competition policy framework of  the  acquis  communautaire  into  their  national  laws.  But  staff
working in the agencies need  time  to  catch  up  to  the  new  requirements  and  to  gather  new
experience, whilst the most capable experts will tend to be attracted into private sector  law  firms
in general and consulting firms in particular offering a multiple  of  their  former  salaries  (and  the
Commission has likewise dried up the market to staff its  DG  Comp).  “This  loss  of  quality  staff
may explain  why  there  is  some  criticism  from  executives  and  counsel  as  to  the  quality  of
decisions coming out of some of the NCAs. Sometimes basic antitrust principles are  not  applied
or an unfortunate anachronistic formalistic approach to antitrust law is applied” (Riley 2005a). It is
the set of very special particularities in the new member  states  that  make  the  application  of  a
western-style competition policy so difficult in formally socialist economies: Eastern NCAs tend to
be much more burdened with work on cases related to cartels and state-aid[18]  which  is  mainly
rooted  in  a  lack  of  competition  culture  and  a  knock-on  effect  of  privatisation  programmes.
Furthermore,  NCAs  in  the  East  are  much  more  burdened   with   merger   cases   than   their
counterparts in the West due to intense market  restructuring  and  the  sheer  volume  of  foreign
direct investment  that  had  been  attracted  into  the  region  by  policies  often  at  variance  with
competition law. These burdens prevented Eastern NCAs to devote as  much  time  to  hard-core
cartel busting as would have been necessary to reach Western levels of  anti-trust  effectiveness.
Finally, NCAs in the new member states remain to  establish  a  powerful  politically  independent
track record to be able to vigilantly apply competition rules to the still  very  substantial  economic
activities of their state sectors (Riley 2005b).
            In this respect, tables 3.1 and 3.2 offer an overview of the number of cases  that  led  to  a
decision by the competition authorities of our selection of Central East  European  Countries  and
Germany as a point of reference.[19] Naturally, the numbers cannot be compared easily between
countries: not only is the size of the country the  most  important  determinant  of  the  number  of
cases. Also the definition of what constitutes a case and a decision  is  country-specific.  Still,  the
information gathered in this table can provide a general  picture  of  the  intensity  with  which  the
competition   authorities   apply   competition   law:   the   cross-country   comparisons   and    the
developments in time of shares of decisions  deemed  unlawful,  or  in  the  case  of  mergers  the
share of prohibitions and conditional  approvals,  are  in  fact  insightful.  Merger  control,  a  field,
where companies planning to merge would typically notify the competition authority(ies)  involved
themselves  (hence  a  low  share  of  cases  initiated  ex  officio),  could  be  expected  to  play  a
particularly  important  role  in  transition  countries:  privatisation  of   large   former   state-owned
conglomerate companies often resulted in their break-up into small units that subsequently found
themselves below optimal sizes, and the so-called ‘bottom-up’ privatisation from start-ups equally
may seek strategic merger partners to secure competitiveness via  scale  economies  (see  Table
3.1).
Table 3.1         Merger control case-decisions, 1997-2007
Mergers |1997 |1998 |1999 |2000 |2001 |2002 |2003 |2004 |2005 |2006  |2007 | |Czech Republic | | | | | | |
| | | | | |  No. of decisions |58 |57 |51 |57 |140 |238 |225 |164 |n/a |n/a |n/a | |  ...conditional approval |n/a |n/a
|n/a |6 |6 |9 |7 |1 |1 |3 |n/a | |  ...prohibitions |n/a |n/a |n/a |n/a |1 |2 |1 |1 |1 |0 |n/a | |Hungary | | | | | | | | | | | | |
 No. of decisions |25 |49 |46 |70 |81 |65 |68 |65 |49 |43 |46 | |...ex officio |0 |3 |2 |3 |5 |5 |1 |2 |1 |2   |2 | |
...conditional approval |0 |0 |0 |2 |2 |3 |1 |2 |1 |3  |3 | |  ...prohibitions |0 |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |1 |0 |0 |0  |0 | |Poland
| | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of decisions 1 |1387 |1872 |1079 |1107 |542 |169 |151 |218 |276 |267  |n/a | |
...conditional approval |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |1 |2 |1 |2 |1  |n/a | |  ...prohibitions |2 |1 |0 |0 |0 |0 |0 |2 |0 |1  |n/a |
|Germany | | | | | | | | | | | | | No. of decisions 2 |n/a |n/a |40 |49 |51 |44 |34 |25 |29 |35 |29 | |  ...conditional
approval |n/a |n/a |5 |5 |14 |11 |7 |2 |4 |6 |8  |  |   ...prohibitions  |6  |4  |2  |2  |2  |6  |2  |12  |6  |5  |7  |  |Notes:
1
            The numbers of cases initiated ex officio were very small and only concerned such cases  where  a
fine was imposed on companies  that  did  not  notify  a  merger  and  where  a  company  was
divided into parts. However, there were no such decisions after 1996.
                          
2
           Only second phase.
Sources:                          National  competition  authorities’  official  publications  and  unpublished   agency
information.
In fact, numbers for decided cases are quite high  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  and  Poland  even  if
compared  with  much  larger  Germany.  However,  enforcement  does  not  appear  to   be   overly   strict:
prohibitions in all countries assessed here occur very rarely indeed and approval, even  if  only  conditional,
make up the vast majority of decisions.[20] More interestingly, the peaks  in  numbers  correspond  to
the privatisation processes of the respective countries: Hungary first  privatised  large  companies
and  started  relatively  late  with  small-scale  privatisation,  and  the  proper  Czech  privatisation
programme (neglecting the largely failed voucher-privatisation) also took effect  at  an  even  later
stage. In Poland on the contrary, the high numbers peak much earlier and  then  fall  consistently,
and indeed, small scale and in particular ‘bottom-up’ privatisation here have  a  longer  history.  In
Germany, the more  time-consuming  and  more  meticulous  assessment  in  the  second  phase
involves, as expected, much lower numbers than in the Central East European countries and this
even despite the size-differences of the countries (e.g. in terms  of  the  sheer  number  of  firms).
With respect to the kinds of  decisions  taken,  the  shares  of  decisions  resulting  in  prohibitions
and/or approvals involving  some  form  of  conditions  turn  out  to  be  consistently  lower  in  our
Central East European countries than the shares in Germany. This does suggest a  more  lenient
competition policy, however, it may be rooted to some degree and in  some  cases  in  the  above
explained efficiency-increasing motivation of mergers.
            In the case  of  restrictive  agreements  (cartel)  and  abuse  of  dominance  cases  (which
typically are initiated ex officio), we would expect a falling trend with the  gradual  enforcement  of
the new competition laws and the equally gradual emergence of  a  competition  culture  amongst
firms as potential violators and the deterring effect of fines in previous cases (see  Table  3.2).  In
reality, however,  we  cannot  observe  any  clear-cut  time-trends  in  the  case-numbers  for  our
Central East European Countries as a whole, neither for cartels nor for  dominance  abuses.  The
comparison of numbers of case-decisions between individual  Central  East  European  countries
and Germany provides a diverse picture: for cartel cases, the numbers of decisions in the  Czech
Republic and Hungary appear to correspond to the German ones (corrected for size differences),
the Polish do not and are much lower than the size-differences between the two  countries  would
suggest. For  dominance-abuse  case-decisions,  the  Polish  and  Hungarian  numbers  seem  to
correspond to the  German  ones,  whereas  the  numbers  of  decisions  in  the  Czech  Republic
appear  to  be  much  lower  than  size  would  suggest.  In  terms  of  enforcement  track  record,
indicated by the share of cases where unlawful  behaviour  was  established  in  the  cartel  case-
decisions,  all  our  transition  economies  appear  to  have  a  stricter  enforcement   record   than
Germany with Hungary and Poland closer to Germany than  the  Czech  Republic.  The  result  of
this East-West comparison, however, may be attributed to  a  lower  level  of  competition  culture
amongst firms entering some form of agreement and may have less to do  with  the  strictness  of
competition law enforcement. In terms of case-decisions on  abuses  of  dominance,  the  relation
between shares is reversed: here, the German competition authority has decided in much  higher
shares of cases that unlawful behaviour can be established. Here, Poland  is  close  to  Germany
than Hungary and the Czech Republic. In total, the Czech Republic stands out with an apparently
rather weak policy  enforcement  vis-à-vis  Germany,  whereas  Hungary’s  and  Poland’s  shares
correspond to the ones for Germany.
Table 3.2         Cartel and abuse of dominance case-decisions, 1997-2007
Restrictive agreements |1997 |1998 |1999 |2000 |2001 |2002 |2003 |2004 |2005  |2006 |2007 | |Czech
Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of decisions 1 |(27 |67 |54 |36) |14 |25 |21 |19 |4 |5 |n/a | |  ...unlawful
|n/a |n/a |n/a |n/a |1 |11 |10 |13 |0 |4 |n/a | |Hungary | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of
decisions |5 |16 |15 |18 |10 |18 |20 |28 |21 |19 |15 | |  ...unlawful |1 |5 |6 |11 |1 |10 |12 |12 |9   |15 |12 |
|Poland | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of decisions 2 |n/a  |(306 |355 |374 |354) |40 |38 |26 |(144)  |33 |n/a | | 
...unlawful 2 |n/a |124 |127 |178 |113 |19 |20 |14 |n/a  |18 |n/a | |Germany | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of
decisions |244 |178 |161 |127 |156 |146 |139 |104 |270 |141 |n/a  | |  ...unlawful |60 |61 |38 |23 |41 |59 |49
|36 |46 |27 |n/a  | |Abuses of dominance |1997 |1998 |1999 |2000 |2001 |2002 |2003 |2004 |2005  |2006
|2007 | |Czech Republic | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of decisions 1 |(5 |4 |13 |11) |1 |16 |3 |3 |12 |3 |n/a | |
...unlawful |n/a |n/a |n/a |n/a |0 |4 |2 |0 |5 |0 |n/a | |Hungary | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of
decisions |28 |47 |36 |56 |33 |36 |31 |30 |18  |33 |13 | |  ...unlawful |4 |10 |7 |19 |3 |15 |8 |7 |6  |11 |10 |
|Poland | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of decisions 2 |n/a |(306 |355 |374 |354) |353 |150 |126 |(144)  |170 |n/a | | 
...unlawful 2 |n/a |124 |127 |178 |113 |82 |51 |45 |n/a  |95 |n/a | |Germany | | | | | | | | | | | | |  No. of
decisions |203 |213 |261 |326 |434 |442 |370 |306 |908 |514 |n/a  | |  ...unlawful |36 |94 |52 |92 |259 |284
|201 |144 |478 |206 |n/a  | |Notes:                        1           1997  to  2000:  number  of  cases  started  in  that
year, not decisions taken in the respective years (numbers are provided in parenthesis).
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           1997 to 2001, as well as 2005: the  case  numbers  are  the  sums  for  “Restrictive
agreements” and “Abuses of dominant position” (numbers are  provided  in  parenthesis).  The
Polish authority does not distinguish in its official publications  between  those  two  categories
for those years.
Sources:                          National  competition  authorities’  official  publications  and  unpublished   agency
information.
Some of the more advanced new member states in Central East Europe have begun to crack down on anti-
competitive behaviour and have already imposed significant fines under the national competition rules.  An
assessment of  the  most  significant  cases  in  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  and  Hungary,  in
particular considering the size of the fines, the fields of law violated, and the  industries  involved,
already provides some important information: the size of  most  the  highest  fines  tended  to  fall
since the early 2000s; each country-agency appears to focus on a particular  kind  of  violation  of
competition or fields of anti-trust law (with  Poland  on  abuse  of  dominant  market  position,  the
Czech Republic on abuse of dominant market position and additionally cartels,  and  Hungary  on
bid-rigging and other forms of cartels; and on particular  industries  (with  Poland  on  utilities,  the
Czech  Republic  on  telecommunication,  and  Hungary  on  the  construction  industry).   In   the
following, we list only the most significant cases with the highest fines levied:
            In Poland, the largest fines were imposed  against  firms  abusing  their  dominant  market
position. The most severe cases include:
•             a fine  of  € 9.5  million  upon  the  power  generating  company  Polskie  Górnictwo
Naftowe i Gazownictwo in October 2004 for abusing its dominant market position to  ward
off the efforts of a large-scale customer to get a user-classification  in  a  more  favourable
tariff group in September 2001;
•             two fines totalling € 12.9 million upon the Polish State Railway PKP and PKP Cargo
in June 2004 for abusing  its  dominant  market  position  to  tie  its  clients  into  long-term
contracts in which the company forces its clients to accept onerous co-operation terms;
•             three fines amounting to € 6 million upon Telecomunikacja Polska in May 2004 and
April 2005, for abusing its dominant market position to force licensees to  accept  onerous
contractual terms and  for  not  complying  with  the  order  of  the  competition  agency  to
discontinue this practice.
Cases of restrictive agreements and cartels did not play a significant role in Poland  in  2004  and
the  first  half  of  2005  with  fines  amounting   to   € 0.9   million   in   only   four   cases   involving
pharmaceuticals and publishing houses. In February 2004, i.e. slightly  before  the  reform  of  EU
competition law, two merger cases were found to have been unlawful due to the  failure  to  notify
the competition agency of the take-over.  Both  cases  involved  publishing  houses  and  fines  of
€ 50,000 were levied in both cases. Neither in the Czech Republic nor  in  Hungary  could  we  find
cases in merger-control that ended in the imposition of a fine.
            The Czech competition agency imposed the  largest  fines  on  Czech  telecommunication
firms and mobile operators in four cases of abuse of dominant position and cartel agreements:
•              a  fine  of  € 2.1  million  upon  the  companies   Eurotel   Praha,   spol.   s.r.o.   and
RadioMobil a.s. in May 2002 for abuses of dominant positions in 2000 and 2001 (charging
higher per-minute prices between their respective networks  than  mutually  invoiced),  the
Eurotel Praha-fine was finally settled in February 2005;
•             a fine of € 1.4 million upon the companies Eurotel  Praha  (again),  ?eský  Telecom,
and T-Mobile Czech Republic in September 2004 for cartel agreements  (the  agreements
obliged signatories, except for sporadic cases, to interconnect their  networks  exclusively
by a direct form thereby excluding services of third parties) in 2000 and 2001;
•             a fine of € 0.8 million upon the company  ?eský  Telecom  (again)  in  late  2004  for
abuse of its  dominant  position  (in  the  market  for  provision  of  access  to  the  Internet
services and data transmission services via broadband technology  xDSL  (ADSL)  at  the
public  fixed  telecommunication  networks  to  the  detriment   of   competitors   and   final
consumers) in 2002;
•             a fine of € 0.3 million upon the company ?eský Telecom (again) in  March  2005  for
threatening competition on the market of supply of modems and  accessories  for  Internet
connection  through  ADSL  technology  (prohibited  and  invalid  price   agreements   and
including them into supply contracts).
Two even larger fines were levied in other industries: in August 2004 against a  cartel  agreement
on the market of building savings in 2001  with  a  total  fine  of  € 15.8  million  (case  still  pending
because the appeal period  is  not  over)  and  in  September  2002  against  a  cartel  agreement
between fuel distributors with a total fine of € 9.6 million (involving the companies Agip Praha, a.s.,
Aral ?R, a.s., BENZINA a.s., ConocoPhillips Czech Republic s.r.o., OMV  ?eská  republika,  s.r.o.
and Shell Czech Republic a.s. for fixing sale price for car petrol  Natural  95  sold  by  their  petrol
stations in the period beginning on 28 May 2001 and ending on 30 November 2001. This practice
was aimed at restricting competition on the market of the car petrol delivered to consumers).
            In Hungary, the Office of Economic Competition had to mainly focus  on  the  construction
industry. Here, the largest fines occurred in 6 cases of bid-rigging and the formation of cartels:
•             a fine of € 2.6 million upon three construction firms in March 2004 for colluding in  a
public tender for a larger construction project in Budapest in 2002, the firms fined included
Baucont Rt., ÉPKER Kft. and KÉSZ Kft.;
•             a fine of € 1.2 million upon the companies Baucont Rt. (again)  and  Középületépitö
Rt. (charges against KÉSZ Kft.  were  dismissed)  also  in  March  2004  for  concluding  a
restrictive agreement in a public tender  for  a  construction  project  for  the  University  of
Kaposvár in 2002;
•             a fine of € 1 million upon the companies Strabag Rt., EGUT Rt., and RING Kft. also
in March 2004 for coordinating their bids for an underground Metro construction project  in
Budapest in 2002;
•             a fine of € 0.64 million upon the companies  Holcim  Hungaria  Rt.  (Holcim),  Duna-
Dráva  Cement  Kft.,  BÉCEM  Cement   és   Mészipari   Rt.,   and   Magyar   Cementipari
Szövetség in October 2002 for concluding and implementing an  illegal  information  cartel
agreement and for abusing their dominant position in 2000 and 2001;
•             two smaller fines against construction firms  colluding  in  a  public  tender  bidding
process in two cases. Both fines were levied in 2004, well after the legal changes  of  May
2004.
The   Office   of   Economic   Competition   also   had   to   deal   with    restrictive    practices    of
telecommunication firms and levied fines amounting to € 1.7  million  between  2002  and  2005  in
four cases of deception of consumers, restrictive agreements and abuse of dominant position  (of
which three smaller fines were all levied in 2005 for unlawful conduct in 2004, and  one  fine  with
€ 1.4 million having been levied in 2003 for misconduct between  1998-2001).  A  whole  variety  of
cases in other industries concerned restrictive agreements with fines between 2002 and  2005  in
five cases amounting to € 2.5 million (of which only one had been concluded after May  2004),  the
abuse of dominant positions with fines during the same time-span in  five  cases  summing  up  to
€ 1.1  million  (all  of  which  had  been  levied  between  2002  and  2003,  none   thereafter),   and
deception of consumers with fines in ten cases amounting to € 0.8 million (of which most had been
concluded after May 2004).
            Whilst such an analysis at individual case-level can only provide incidental  evidence  and
can hardly be compared across countries, we may still conclude  that  our  countries  in  the  East
have evidently competition policy enforcement that they can draw attention to in  a  debate  about
the laxness of their regimes. However, most of cases selected here would belong to  sectors  that
would  in  the  West  be  subject  to  economic  regulation  and  hence  do  not   serve   to   signify
particularly effective enforcement of competition law. What is most striking  is  that  the  countries
do not yet appear to have  a  positive  record  of  a  comprehensive  scope  of  competition  policy
enforcement across the whole scope of industries and of fields of violation. Rather,  the  agencies
of these countries appear to focus on particular issues and  industries,  and  it  remains  an  open
question as to whether the “omitted” areas in fact enjoy a cartel paradise à là Pirrung.
5          Conclusions
Switching from a state-controlled  economic  system  to  one  where  firms  are  governed  by  the
forces  of  markets  in  general  and  competition  in  particular,  competition  policy  has  to  make
previously monopolised markets competitive in the first place.  With  the  main  challenge  for  the
formerly socialist economies to technologically catch up, competition policy  should  be  expected
to be regarded as the prime policy-instrument to motivate firms  to  generate  innovations  (for  an
empirical account of the competition-innovation nexus in transition economies, see: Carlin  et  al.,
2004)[21].
This  study  established  that   competition   policy   enforcement   in   East   European   transition
economies is less stringent, less  effective:  there  is  still  no  level  playing  field  with  respect  to
competition law enforcement between the West and the East and in particular  also  not  with  the
new EU member states of Central East Europe. This could be shown on  macro  and  institutional
levels with a review of case-numbers. This picture was complimented by anecdotal  evidence  on
the cases that led to significant  fines  for  anti-competitive  behaviour.  Intuitively,  these  findings
seem to call for policy action.  However,  given  the  diagnosis  that  the  lack  of  competition  has
systemic  reasons  rooted  in  the  socialist  past  of  the  new  EU   member   countries   and   the
particularity of transformation of the economic system itself, there seems to be  no  fast  track  for
effective competition policy implementation. Formally, the  law  is  already  sufficiently  introduced
and its effective enforcement comparable to Western Euroepan levels will  have  to  follow  in  the
future with  both  the  intensity  of  market  restructuring  slowly  abating  the  national  institutions
moving up the learning curve.
            In addition to this conclusion the context of EU modernization of competition law itself has
to be taken into account. Despite the fact that the reform of the EU competition policy  framework
was not tuned  to  the  particularities  of  the  new  member  states  in  the  East  and  despite  the
expectation that  the  new  institutions  may  potentially  be  more  difficult  to  digest  in  the  East
(increased legal uncertainty and a gap in institutional learning), it appears from the empirical data
that  the  most  advanced  CEE  countries  did  not  experience  a  significant  draw-back  in  their
effectiveness of national competition policy. Taking the major changes of EU competition law into
consideration leads us to the conclusion, that it is most likely that Brussels’ DG competition will fill
the existing power vacuum in the new EU member  countries.   This  will  be  the  function  of  the
newly established cooperative institution of the European Competition Network (ECN). It will lead
to a very powerful European institutional authority under the guidance of DG  Competition,  which
raises  the  long-standing  doubts  about  its  democratic  legitimacy  and  degree  of  subsidiarity.
However, for the foreseeable future the EU does not follow the  example  of  the  US.  Apart  from
political and legal aspects, the economic  conclusion  with  a  view  on  protecting  competition  in
eastern markets is that although competition policy in the new EU member states is  weak,  there
is no need for action.  The  modernized  European  institutions  seem  to  be  fit  to  deal  with  the
problem. Rather, it will in the near future be in particular state-aid that will prove to be much more
of a problem in the case of the new EU member states (Dias, 2004, with a focus on steel-industry
Lienemeyer, 2005, and on the next EU enlargement cases Casteele, 2005).
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[22] The observation by Audretsch et al. (2001) that EU competition policy appears to emphasise
static welfare optimisation rather than dynamic aspects  of  innovation  could  not  be  explored
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